2025: A Challenging Year for European Security

There are strong indications that 2025 will be a particularly challenging year for European security. Yet, the leaders of the Old Continent seem to continue ignoring these warnings.

“Russia trains for attack on Finland and Baltic States” – such alarming headlines marked the end of 2024 in Europe. These reports are based on information from the Finnish daily “Iltalehti”, which published its article on December 25, 2024 – 1036 days after Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine began.

According to “Iltalehti”, which cites anonymous NATO sources, Russia has been training attacks on Finland and other NATO eastern flank countries. The same source suggests that “Russia’s goal could be to restore the borders established by the Peace of Turku in 1743. This would mean advancing as far as the Kymijoki River. In the north, the attack might target the Puumala Strait (…) Russian missile strikes could also target Helsinki. In the Baltics, Russia’s main assault direction would involve a comprehensive offensive.”

Simultaneously, the Finnish government warned that “the war in Ukraine has shown that Russia is willing to take significant risks, regardless of losses.”

Such press reports might not have caused such unease in Central and Eastern Europe if, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West had succeeded in building robust and efficient military capabilities alongside credible deterrence.

The rising anxiety in Central and Eastern Europe is further fueled by the policies of the Biden administration. While the United States has provided military support to Ukraine in its fight against Russia, many have noted that the White House’s approach has often seemed ambiguous. On the one hand, the U.S. aimed to prevent Russia from winning the war, but on the other, its goal appeared to ensure that the Kremlin did not suffer a strategic defeat.

The anticipated transition of power to Donald Trump exacerbates these concerns. His potential policies regarding Central and Eastern Europe, NATO, and Russia remain a significant uncertainty, with conflicting signals emerging from his political camp.

In states such as Poland, which allocated 3.8% of its GDP to defense in 2024, there are growing doubts about whether the United States would act decisively in the event of war against NATO members. Some commentators argue that America would be forced to respond, as failure to do so would damage its reputation as a superpower. Allies around the globe, including South Korea, would question the reliability of American security guarantees.

Conversely, if reports are accurate that the White House’s hesitation in providing advanced weapons to Ukraine stemmed from fears of nuclear escalation by the Kremlin, Central and Eastern European states have legitimate reasons to worry. The same logic might apply to them: the U.S. would be unlikely to risk escalation in their defense. For Washington, maintaining credibility as a security guarantor is less critical than avoiding a nuclear or large-scale conventional war.

Such calculations would shape the decisions of any White House administration, regardless of whether the country in question is a NATO member or a peripheral ally. Central and Eastern European NATO members undeniably hold secondary importance to the United States, whose priorities remain avoiding nuclear conflict and large-scale war.

The specter of war escalation in 2025 is even more alarming for Western European states. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine and Moscow’s provocative policies, they have done little to significantly enhance their military capabilities. This sends a clear message: they are also unprepared to shoulder alliance commitments in the event of an armed conflict in Central and Eastern Europe.

Konrad Muzyka, a prominent Polish analyst specializing in the Russia-Ukraine War and director of Rochan Consulting, observes a widespread consensus among European experts: “The best times are behind us. We are entering a very challenging year, which may bring a significant redefinition of Europe’s security architecture.”

Muzyka identifies three factors that will make 2025 difficult for European security: the limited presence of U.S. forces in Europe, Ukraine’s increasing territorial losses, and the potential transfer of European NATO forces to Ukraine.

“Unfortunately, Europe still does not view the current situation as a new reality,” Muzyka notes. “Europe is stuck in the belief that the United States will defend it. Statements by our top politicians about the goals of increased military spending confirm that we are drifting without a plan or a leader.”

Entering 2025, it is crucial to remember that at the beginning of 2022, a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine seemed unlikely. When it happened, most experts doubted Ukraine’s ability to defend itself effectively. Both scenarios unfolded, proving that no possibilities should be dismissed and that preparation is essential.

The words of General Ben Hodges, former Commander of the U.S. Army Europe, serve as a stark reminder: “We spend too much time worrying about what the Russians might do. Instead, we should make them worry about what we’re capable of.”

Secondly, hope alone will not deter the Russian regime from escalating the conflict. Russia’s long-term and historical goal – regardless of who leads the Kremlin – is to weaken the West. If the West, including the United States, fails to stop Russia now, they will face an emboldened Kremlin in a few years under less favorable circumstances.

The lessons of recent years must guide Europe and the West as they prepare for what 2025 may bring. Without decisive action and a comprehensive plan, the threats looming over the continent will only grow.

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